The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968 by Tarlock, A. Dan & Tippy, Roger
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
1970
The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968
A. Dan Tarlock
Indiana University School of Law
Roger Tippy
New England River Basins Commission
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Natural Resources Law Commons, and the Water Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tarlock, A. Dan and Tippy, Roger, "The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968" (1970). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 2347.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2347
THE WILD AND SCENIC RIVERS ACT
OF 1968
A. Dan Tarlockh and Roger Tippyf-
The Congress declares that the established national policy of dam
and other construction at appropriate sections of the rivers of the
United States needs to be complemented by a policy that would
preserve other selected rivers or sections thereof in their free-flowing
condition .... 1
The original impetus for enactment of the Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act of 19682 is thus phrased in the preface of the Act. How-
ever, the legislation became more than a counterweight to federal
dam-building programs; it is also an effort to limit the development
of certain rivers and their banks in the name of recreation.8 If the
Act succeeds in its purpose, it may serve as a model for future limited-
development legislation to protect other segments of the environment.
I
THE OluGINs OF THE LEGISLATION
The era of the high dam and large reservoir began early in the
twentieth century. Out of the progressive period presided over by Pres-
t Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington. A.B. 1962, LL.B.
1965, Stanford University.
.it Staff Counsel, New England River Basins Commission. A.B. 1962, Stanford Uni-
versity; LL.B. 1965, Yale University.'Opinions expressed in this article are personal to
the authors and do not reflect official positions of the New England River Basins Com-
mission.
1 Wild and Scenic Rivers Act § l(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (Supp. IV, 1969).
2 Id. §§ 1271-87.
3 Those who want more resources allocated to recreation range from those who would
like most areas preserved in their pristine state to those who would manage areas on a
turnstile basis to maximize the number of users. See Margolis, Our Country Tis of Thee,
Land of Ecology, EsquIRE, March 1970, at 124, for a readable roadmap to the various
positions among the "new" conservationists. The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act represents
an intermediate position; according to the category of river, recreational development
will be allowed, but will be limited to that which will not substantially alter the char-
acter of the river corridor and its ecosystems at the time of inclusion within the system.
In terms of the Outdoor Recreation Review Commission's six-fold classification scheme
for areas-high density, general outdoor, historic and cultural sites, natural environment,
unique natural, and primitive-the legislation indicates a clear preference for recre-
ational development consistent with only the last three categories. We have adopted the
term "limited development" to characterize the general purpose of the legislation. See
generally Lawson & Knetsch, Outdoor Recreation Research: Some Concepts and Suggested-
Areas of Study, S NATURAL REsoURcEs J. 250 (1963).
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ident Theodore Roosevelt came two important concepts that shaped
this century's natural resources policy.4 These were the idea of system-
atic and efficient resource development 5 and the idea of government
financing and construction of large-scale water developments. 6 From
these concepts emerged the theory of multiple-purpose resource develop-
ment-comprehensive river basin development achieved by impound-
ing large amounts of water for flood control, irrigation, and water
supply-which was the cornerstone of public natural resources policy
until the past decade.
In the 1930's the ravages of floods and droughts and a political
climate favoring public development of hydroelectric power caused
the damming of rivers for the public benefit to assume major pro-
portions. Federal agencies were soon faced with a demand for more
projects than they could handle; in response, they began to develop
project evaluation formulas, which marked the emergence of profes-
sional resource planning. In 1934 the National Resources Board rec-
ommended that as a rule federal funds "will be contributed to a
project . . . only where the benefit from flood protection will justify
the expense of such flood protection. ' 7 This was made law by Congress
in the Flood Control Act of 1936,8 and became recognized as federal
policy in all phases of water resource development.9
Cost-benefit calculations were unsatisfactory in several respects.
The Bureau of Reclamation and the United States Army Corps of
Engineers consistently overestimated project benefits and underesti-
mated project costs; as a result, massive federal subsidies were often
4 For a general survey of twentieth century conservation history, see Griffith, Main
Lines of Thought and Action, in PERSPECTIVES ON CONSERVATION 3 (H. Jarrett ed. 1958).
5 In his important history, Samuel P. Hays argues convincingly that the conservation
movement "above all, was a scientific movement .... Its essence was rational planning
to promote efficient development and use of all natural resources." S. HAYS, CONSERVATION
AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT 1890-1920, at
2 (1959). Hays emphasizes that "apostles of the gospel of efficiency subordinated the aes-
thetic to the utilitarian. Preservation of natural scenery and historic sites . . . remained
subordinate to increasing industrial productivity." Id. at 127.
6 See, e.g., Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. §§ 372-616 (1964).
7 NATIONAL RESOURCES BD., REPORT ON NATIONAL PLANNING AND PUBLIC WORKS 28
(1934).
8 33 US.C. §§ 701a-f, h (1964).
9 The two basic federal documents are FEDERAL INTER-AGENCY RIVER BASIN COtM.,
SUBCOMM. ON BENEFITS AND COSTS, PROPOSED PRACTICES FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF RIVER
BASIN PROJECTS (1950) (commonly called "Green Book'), and PRESIDENT'S WATER RESOURCES
COUNCIL, POLICIES, STANDARDS, AND PROCEDURES IN THE FORMULATION, EVALUATION, AND
REvIEw OF PLANS FOR USE AND DEVELOPMENT OF WATER AND RELATED LAND RESOURCES, S.
Doc. No. 97, 87th Cong, 2d Sess. (1962). Cost-benefit ratios, of course, are not binding
on Congress.
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presented as economically self-sufficient.10 Worse, from an environ-
mental standpoint, was that reliance on cost-benefit ratios drastically
narrowed the perspective of the planner. The question became "is
this project economically justified?" rather than "is this project the
least costly of several alternatives?"" However, as cost-benefit analysis
became increasingly refined by academic economists it occasionally en-
abled advocates of river preservation to challenge a development deci-
sion within its own frame of reference: rather than asserting simply
that preservation is superior to development, 12 advocates could some-
times question the very efficiency of the project. 13 In many other in-
stances, however, preservationists were frustrated, because cost-benefit
analysis cannot account for such values as the worth of a natural
ecosystem.14
Because cost-benefit mathematics was a game usually won by the
dam builders, the opposition considered institutional alternatives. The
:10 Some economists have charged that this practice "leads not merely to a changed
distribution of income but to a lower level of overall economic production." J. HIRSH.
LEwRn, J. DE HAVEN & J. MImLImAN, WATER SUPPLY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY AND POLICY
230 (1960). See also J. BAIN, R. CAVES & J. MARGOLIS, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA'S WATER IN-
DUSTRY (1966).
11 Gilbert White, for example, argues that in planning flood control reservoirs the
Corps of Engineers has given too little thought to the economic efficiency of adjustments
other than dams, such as flood plain zoning and other nonstructural measures. White's
writings are summarized in White, Optimal Flood Plain Management: Retrospect and
Prospect, in WATER REsRaRCH 251 (A. Kneese & S. Smith eds. 1965). For an application of
this criticism, see L. JAMES, A TmE-DEPENDENT PROCESS FOR COMBINING STRUcTuRAL MEA-
SURES, LAND USE, AND FLOOD PROOFING TO MINIMIZE THE ECONOMIC COST OF FLOODS,
REPORT EEP-12, STANFORD UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE IN ENGINEERING-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS (1964).
12 See Tarlock, Book Review, 19 STAN. L. REV. 895, 901 (1967).
:13 This was the case, for example, when it was proposed to dam both ends of the
Grand Canyon to finance the Central Arizona Project. See Carlin, The Grand Canyon
Controversy: Lessons for Federal Cost-Benefit Practices, 44 J. LAND ECON. 219 (1968).
14 Economics cannot show us how to do anything in the sense that these words
are commonly used; it is not a kind of intellectual cake-mix, complete with instruc-
tions for use. What economic theory does is to provide a definition of efficiency
that at best can only help decision-makers to lessen avoidable errors about the
future ....
Hammond, Convention and Limitation in Benefit-Cost Analysis, 6 NATURAL RESOURCES J.
195, 210 (1966) (emphasis in original). There is, of course, a cost to a preservation deci-
sion that can be calculated: the benefits derived from alternative uses of the resource.
M. CLAWSON & J. KNETSCH, ECONOMICS OF OUTDOOR RECREATION 181 (1966). See generally
J. KRUrrLILA & 0. ECHSTEIN, MULTIPLE PURPOSE RIVER DiVELOPMENT 234-64 (1958). The
federal government's efforts to add an overlay of environmental analysis to the engi-
neering and economic studies of water projects began with the Fish and Wildlife Coor-
dination Act of 1934 and were somewhat strengthened by the 1946 amendments to the
same Act. 16 US.C. §§ 661-66c (1964). For a discussion of how preservation values were
treated by federal agencies prior to 1968, see Tippy, Preservation Values in River Basin
Planning, 8 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 259 (1968).
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first of these was the technique of controlling floods with small head-
waters impoundments rather than with large storage reservoirs. Congress
parried this thrust in 1954 by establishing the Soil Conservation Service
small-dams program' 5 as a complement to, rather than a replacement
for, the high dam and big reservoir. Advocates of the unimpounded
stream then turned to the park and recreation concept as an alternative
to dam building. After some general discussion of the desirability of
preserving free-flowing streams as public recreation resources, 16 Con-
gress in 1964 interred an unpopular proposal for a flood control dam
in Missouri by creating the Ozark National Scenic Riverways area under
the administration of the National Park Service.' 7
Although expansion of outdoor recreation opportunities was the
initial goal of scenic river preservation, ecological considerations be-
gan to emerge during the 1960's. In 1965 a study by the Secretaries of
Agriculture and Interior recommended that several rivers be protected
from dam construction. These streams, the initial national wild rivers
system, possessed exceptional outdoor recreational values. The recom-
mendation-introduced as a bill by Senator Church of Idaho-was
primarily a no-dams concept,' 8 and conservation organizations quietly
criticized it for giving little or no attention to intrusions other than
dams that could disturb a natural river environment. As the river
preservation idea moved east of the Rockies' and into areas where
streamside land was mostly in private ownership, the bill became more
than a prohibition on dam building, but conservation organizations
15 Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1001-07 (1964). See
Morgan, The Small Watershed Program, 22 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 405 (1957).
18 See OTrrDOOR RECREATION RESOURCES REVIEW COMu'N, OUTDOOR RECRFATION FOR
AMERCA 177-78 (1962).
17 16 U.S.C. §§ 460m-m-7 (1964). This was not the first congressional recognition of
the value of preserving the free flow of the stream. The Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3621,
§ 2, 84 Stat. 626, gave the Secretary of the Army the power to issue revocable permits
for the diversion of water from the Niagara River as long as it did not interfere with
the navigability of the river or the scenic grandeur of Niagara Falls.
18 S. 1446, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
10 Senators from West Virginia and Pennsylvania amended the bill to have streams
in their states studied for possible inclusion in the wild rivers system. 112 CONG. R1c. 525,
530 (1966) (motions by Senators Randolph of West Virginia and Clark of Pennsylvania).
At the same time some western senators voiced varying degrees of opposition to the bill
as it would affect rivers in their states. The major opposition came from public officials
and private citizens in Wyoming who opposed inclusion of the Green River since it was
the major source of unappropriated water in the state. See Hearings on S. 1446 Before the
Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 89th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 2, at 369-489
(1965). This did not mean there were no supporters of free-flowing streams in the West;
rather, the interests that perceive and pursue the advantages of economic development
of water resources are much better organized in the West.
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still complained that the bill was vague as to the types of activities
and developments that would be permitted along rivers in the national
system.20 They advocated a classification system for preserved rivers to
perpetuate existing land use patterns in a stream valley.2' Landowners
and local governments depending on land taxes for revenue also criti-
cized the broad land acquisition authority in the bill. Protests froni the
Rogue River area in Oregon resulted in an amendment on the Senate
floor denying the government eminent domain authority in any local
jurisdiction where more than half the river frontage was already in
federal ownership.22 The bill, as amended, was passed by the Senate
in 1966, but died in the House Interior Committee.
When the Ninetieth Congress convened in 1967 Senator Church
reintroduced the Senate-passed bill. Representative Saylor of Pennsyl-
vania also reintroduced a bill from the previous Congress, entitled
the "National Scenic Rivers Act." 23 While this bill nominated more
streams for immediate preservation and for study than did the Senate
bill, its most significant feature was a three-part classification system.
In February, Interior Secretary Udall sent Congress a draft bill pro-
posing a twofold classification of "wild" and "scenic" rivers.
24
The major breakthrough came in April of 1967, when Representa-
tive Aspinall of Colorado, Chairman of the House Interior Committee,
introduced yet another bill-the longest and most complex to date.25
The Aspinall bill took a conservative approach to the number of
"instant" scenic rivers: only four western streams would comprise the
20 Of the dozen or more national organizations favoring the legislation, particular
mention should be made of the Izaak Walton League, the National Audubon Society, the
Wilderness Society, and the Wildlife Management Institute. Professional staff represen-
tatives of these groups helped to draft revised versions of the bill, which were then intro-
duced by Congressmen Saylor and Aspinall. Rather than criticize the Senate bill, the
conservationists simply promoted the House bills.
21 The concept was originated by the wildlife biologists Frank and John Craighead.
Hearings on S. 1446, supra note 19, at 23-25.
22 112 CONG. RFc. 523-24 (1966) (remarks of Senators Church and Morse).
23 S. 119, H.R. 90, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967); H.R. 14922, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
24 S. 1092, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
25 H.R. 8416, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The Senate bill passed on August 8, 1967.
Hearings before the House Interior Committee were held in March 1968, and the Com-
mittee reported on the bill in June. H.R. REP. No. 1623, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). It
was brought to the House floor on July 15 on a motion that required a two-thirds vote
for passage. Objections were raised by several Congressmen whose districts encompassed
rivers named in the bill, and the bill was withdrawn. See 114 CONG. REc. 21454-58 (1968).
The Interior Committee revised the bill to meet the objections, and on September 12
the House passed the bill. The differences between House and Senate versions were
quickly resolved, as Congress hurried toward adjournment, and the bill was sent to the
White House on September 26. President Johnson signed it into law on October 2, 1968.
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initial system. Additions to the system were to be made after careful
study of future candidates.28 Most of the administrative provisions of
the Aspinall bill were carried into the eventual statute; subsequent
changes generally involved the treatment of specific rivers or the lan-
guage in the classification system.
The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act became law in October 1968.27
The Act created an initial National Wild and Scenic Rivers System
consisting of sections of eight rivers. Five are in the West, flowing
across lands mostly in federal ownership. The other three are in the
Midwest, each posing few land acquisition problems and enjoying
strong local support for preservation management. The Act further
earmarked twenty-seven rivers for further study and possible addition
to the system in the future.
II
CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES FOR INCLUSION
The Act recognizes three types of rivers to which protection may
be extended. Defined in language taken from the 1966 Saylor bill,
these types are: (1) wild river areas, "vestiges of primitive America";
(2) scenic river areas, accessible by road but largely undeveloped; and
(3) recreational river areas, readily accessible and somewhat developed.28
28 In these studies, the greatest attention would be given to land acquisition, land-
use regulation, and the delineation of boundaries for scenic river areas pursuant to
a six-fold classification system. The bill followed the Saylor bill in other respects,
such as setting a timetable for submission of recommendations on the study group rivers
and providing interim preservation for those placed in a study group. Restrictions on
mining activities were stricter than those proposed in the Saylor bill, and a larger role
was given to the states in decisions on study group rivers.
27 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-87 (Supp. IV, 1969).
28 (b) A wild, scenic or recreational river area eligible to be included in the
system is a free-flowing stream and the related adjacent land area that possesses
one or more of the values referred to in section 1271 of this title. Every wild,
scenic or recreational river in its free-flowing condition, or upon restoration to
this condition, shall be considered eligible for inclusion in the national wild and
scenic rivers system and, if included, shall be classified, designated, and admin-
istered as one of the following:
(1) Wild river areas-Those rivers or sections of rivers that are free of im-
poundments and generally inaccessible except by trail, with watersheds or shore-
lines essentially primitive and waters unpolluted. These represent vestiges of
primitive America.
(2) Scenic river areas-Those rivers or sections of rivers that are free of
impoundments, with shorelines or watersheds still largely primitive and shore-
lines largely undeveloped, but accessible in places by roads.
(3) Recreational river areas-Those rivers or sections of rivers that are
readily accessible by road or railroad, and that may have some development
[Vol. 55:707
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Except that a river classified as "wild" receives special protection against
mining, the particular classification of a river determines only the way
in which the river area is administered. 29
The Act contemplates periodic addition of rivers to the national
system. There are four procedures for making such an addition: (1) a
later act of Congress in response to a study of a river as directed by
section 5 of the Act;80 (2) a later act of Congress in response to a
study subsequently requested by Congress;3 1 (3) a later act of Congress
in response to recommendations contained in a multiple-purpose river
basin study; or (4) the Secretary of the Interior's approval of a gov-
ernor's request to designate a state-administered river corridor as a
unit of the national system.8 2
The 1968 Act designates twenty-seven rivers for further study;
recommendations are to be submitted within ten years after enactment.
along their shorelines, and that may have undergone some impoundment or
diversion in the past.
Id. § 1273.
29 Id. § 1281. The bill approved by the Senate in 1966 did not include a classification
scheme, an omission which, according to Mr. Saylor, would "lead inevitably to an erosion
of the beauty and wildness of the most unspoiled of the streams." 112 CoNG. REc. 10043
(1966). Mr. Saylor's apprehensions were supported by the Senate committee's report,
which stated that the bill was "not nearly as restrictive" as the Wilderness Act and
pointed out that it would not limit timber harvesting and livestock grazing, nor would
it prohibit the location of new mining claims. S. RaP. No. 792, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965). Thus multiple use, though without dams, remained the objective. The Senate
bill of 1967 included a wild and scenic category, but the distinction appeared to have
little bearing on management policy. The Aspinall bill of that year proposed a six-fold
classification of rivers. H.R. 8416, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(b) (1967). The House
Interior Committee adopted the Saylor version, adding the observation that recreation
development could be incompatible with natural preservation. Classification of a river
in the wild category should therefore curb alteration in the names of recreation and of
economic development alike. H.R. RE. No. 1623, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1968).
30 16 U.S.C. § 1276(b) (Supp. IV, 1969).
31 Id. § 1275(a).
32 Id. § 1273(a). This formula was arrived at after many revisions. The original ad-
ministration bill directed the two Secretaries to consult with the appropriate governors
"to ascertain whether a joint Federal-State plan is feasible" to preserve the various rivers
listed in the study group. The Secretaries were to have full control, however, over the
formulation of the recommendation to the President. In 1966 the Senate added language
permitting a governor to make an independent recommendation to the President con-
cerning a river in his state if the river ran through non-federal land. S. 1446, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 3(b) (1966). The Aspinall bill went a step further in accommodating state pro-
grams; it barred the Secretary from carrying out a study of a river named for study if the
appropriate governor certified that the state would carry out the study and would recom-
mend for or against inclusion in the national system. H.R. 8416, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 5(b)(ii) (1967). So long as the state did "in fact pursue said study with diligence" the
Secretary could not direct the study. The House approved this version, but in conference
with the Senate it was modified to provide for joint studies at a state's request.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Until 1973, section 7 protects these rivers against alteration by any
project that requires a Federal Power Commission license, or funding
or licensing by other federal agencies. 83 In essence, this provision gives
the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Agriculture a veto
power until 1973 over proposals for dams or related developments on
any of the twenty-seven study group rivers. The five-year protection
period may be shortened if the appropriate Secretary completes a study
and recommends that a river does not merit inclusion in the national
system. The period may also be extended up to an additional three
years after a favorable recommendation is made, to allow time for
Congress to consider the report. During the study period, the public
lands beside a named river are withdrawn from homestead entry and
mineral development.34
Section 12 of the Act directs the two Secretaries and the heads of
other federal agencies to review those portions of their plans, contracts,
and policies that may affect lands adjacent to any of the study group
rivers.35 Particular attention is to be given to timber harvesting, road
construction, and similar activities which "might be contrary to the
purposes" of the Act.8 6 This review is required in order to determine
what actions should be taken to protect the rivers while they are in
candidate status; it provides a means for dealing with scenic rivers
for which there are reasonable alternative developments or the protec-
tion of which would require undetermined but substantial land acquisi-
tion. Hopefully, a study will resolve conflicts in the pre-legislative phase.
Study managers are encouraged, though not required, to hold public
hearings in the localities affected by particular proposals. This interim
protection is much weaker than the protection against water resources
projects in that the project sponsor is the sole judge of compatibility;8 7
neither Secretary has a veto, as each has over water resources projects
under section 7.
The format for presenting recommendations is set out in some
detail.88 Each proposal is reviewed by the Corps of Engineers, the
Federal Power Commission, and other departments having a particular
interest. Review is also made by the Secretary of Agriculture if the
Secretary of the Interior makes the report, and vice versa. If land acqui-
33 16 U.S.C. § 1278(b) (Supp. IV, 1969).
84 Id. § 1280(b).
85 Id. § 1283(a).
86 Id.
37 Id.
88 Id. § 1275(b).
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sition is necessary, the governor of each state affected by a proposal
also reviews it. The comments of these officials are appended to the
report, and the whole, with every possible development alternative
presumably on the record, is printed as a House or Senate document.
Section 5(d)39 directs the dam-building bureaus to observe a similar
regard for preservation. Every agency that submits a river basin and
project plan report to Congress is required to "consider and discuss"
potential additions to the wild and scenic rivers system. The objects of
this mandate, other than the Interior and Agriculture Departments, are
the Corps of Engineers and the various river basin commissions. These
are the organizations that design and lead river basin studies and sub-
mit the resultant plans to Congress through the Water Resources
Council.40 The plans are used by Congress as a basis and reference for
appropriations for specific projects, and a proposal for a scenic river
corridor can be put in "project" form as easily as a proposal for a flood
control dam.41 The Act also links preservation studies to basin plan-
ning by calling for the coordination of reviews of the study group rivers
with any planning for the same rivers being conducted under the Water
Resources Planning Act of 1965.4
A river may be included in the national system of wild and scenic
rivers if it meets the criteria of one of the classifications and is effectively
protected under state law. Once a state has preserved a scenic river,
there are two advantages to designating the stream a part of the national
system. First, the prohibitions against federally sponsored or licensed
development become applicable. The second advantage, perhaps of
dubious merit in some cases, is the greater publicity attaching to any
recreation area of "national" significance.
89 Id. § 1276(d).
40 See Water Resources Planning Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1962-62d (Supp. IV, 1969). This
Act created the inter-agency Water Resources Council, authorized the establishment of
federal-state river basin commissions, and gave some legislative recognition to principles
of water resources planning formulated by the executive branch. See S. Doc. No. 97, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). The Council has defined four types of planning, ranging from
general framework studies to specific single-project plans. Wild and scenic river preserva-
tion has been assigned a definite place in the formulation of all types of water resources
planning. See generally Hart, Creative Federalism: Recent Trends in Regional Water
Resources Planning and Development, 39 U. COLO. L. Rrv. 29 (1966).
41 See, e.g., 1 COORDINATING COMMITTI, COPREHENSIVE BASIN STUDY, WHITE RIvFR
BASIN, ARKANSAS AND MISSOURI 105 (1968). This report, prepared under leadership of the
Corps of Engineers, recommends addition of the Buffalo and Eleven Point Rivers in
Arkansas to the national scenic rivers system (while at the same time recommending a
number of construction projects).
42 42 U.S.C. §§ 1962-62d (Supp. IV, 1969).
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The procedure for designation in such cases originates with the
governors of the states involved, who submit a request to the Secretary
of the Interior. The Secretary's approval depends on his first finding
that the river meets one of the classifications and that administration of
the river will involve no federal expense. He may prescribe supplemen-
tary criteria, such as a commitment by the state that the bed of a
navigable river will not be disturbed by mining.4 3 The Secretary must
also submit the request for review and comment by the Secretaries of
Agriculture and the Army, the Chairman of the FPC, and the chief of
any other federal agency that may have an interest. In this phase the
Corps of Engineers and other construction agencies may again present
development alternatives for the record. The Secretary is directed to
consider comments received from the other agencies and to publish
his decision in the Federal Register.
States may also administer a part of the national system through
the recommendations formulated on any of the twenty-seven study
group rivers. The Act permits a state to request a joint state-federal
study of any one of these rivers and directs the appropriate Secretary
to accede to such a request.44 After the study, the Secretary shall deter-
mine the degree to which a state or its local governments might par-
ticipate in the preservation and administration of a national system
river. In a provision that originated with the Saylor bill, the Secretary
of the Interior is directed to encourage states to include state and local
stream preservation programs in their outdoor recreation plans.45 Such
encouragement may include grants from the Land and Water Conser-
vation Fund.40 The Secretary is also authorized to provide technical
assistance and advice to states, local governments, and private interests,
including non-profit organizations, who wish to establish wild, scenic,
or recreational river areas. This provision may acquire more significance
after 1973, when the Interior Department completes reviews of the
twenty-seven study group rivers. At present, however, the review pro-
cess absorbs all appropriations to the Department for studies under
the Act.
43 The House-passed bill required states to prohibit mining in navigable waters.
H.R. 18260, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 13(c) (1968). This provision was dropped in conference
without explanation, and apparently without prejudice to the Secretary's ability to impose
such a requirement in his discretion.
44 16 U.S.C. § 1276(c) (Supp. IV, 1969).
45 Id. § 1282.
40 Id. § 4601-5.
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III
MANAGEMENT oF TmH RrvER CORRIDOR
A. Land Acquisition
Section 6 of the Act provides for acquisition of land for a pro-
tective corridor. On the many rivers in the Far West that run through
the public domain, land acquisition will probably be confined to
scattered access areas, cabin sites, and resorts that would have a blight-
ing effect on the river corridor. However, in the Eastern United States
many potential system rivers now exhibit a high level of recreational
development, 47 much of which would be inconsistent with the purpose
of the Act were the rivers included. In some instances intensive use will
preclude the river's being included within the system, but in others the
federal government may feel that selective acquisitions of private land,
some of which is developed, may suffice to bring the river up to the
statutory standards for designation as a recreational, or perhaps scenic,
river.
The possibility of widespread acquisitions troubled many Congress-
men whose constituents saw the Act as a threat to their recreational
sites. During the hearings, representatives from the Departments of
Interior and Agriculture were sharply questioned about their land
acquisition and management policies. Objecting Congressmen sought
to limit the power of eminent domain delegated to the two Secretaries
and to commit the two Departments to acquisition policies favorable to
the maintenance of existing uses in order to maximize the opportunities
for general recreation.48
Under the Act the government may take either fee simple titles
or scenic easements. The basic policy question considered by Congress
was what type of restrictions would be placed on the acquisition of each
of these interests. Proposed restrictions generally took the form of
acreage and distance limitations, and the final bill represented a com-
promise between broad and limited acquisition powers. In designating
47 For examples of such rivers, see Hearings on H.R. 8416 Before the Subcomm. on
National Parks and Recreation of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 136-37 (1968).
48 The following statement of condemnation policy was offered by the Department
of the Interior to please these Congressmen:
I know it is our intent that if you have one of these rivers established, and you
find a summer home there, and it can be handled in a way that in the judgment
of the Secretary it is not incompatible with the purpose of the river, the intent
would be to leave it. We would not clean out everything.
Id. at 157 (statement of Dr. Edward C. Crafts, Director, Bureau of Outdoor Recreation).
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the boundaries of the system the Secretaries are limited to an average
of not more than 320 acres per mile on both sides of the river.49 Section
6(a) limits fee simple acquisitions by any method to an average of 100
acres per mile on both sides of the river.50 Scenic easements can be
acquired for the rest of the acreage included within the boundaries. 51
Since acreage iverages are calculated for the entire length of the river,52
the Secretaries have the flexibility to vary the width of the corridor
boundaries as circumstances dictate.53
There are two significant restrictions on the right to condemn
property. If fifty percent of the acreage of the entire river area is
owned by federal, state, or local government, fee titles may not be
condemned, although scenic easements may be taken.54 If the land is
within a city, village, or borough, it cannot be condemned if the juris-
49 16 U.S.C. § 1274(b) (Supp. IV, 1969). The two Secretaries may also exchange federal
lands outside the system for nonfederal lands within the system. Id. § 1277(d). This will
be a useful tool in the West. See 34 Fed. Reg. 15565, 15566 (1969) (development plan for
Middle Fork Clearwater Wild and Scenic River Area). If land is condemned, § 1277(g)(1)
permits the owners to continue to occupy it. The owner of "improved property for non-
commercial residential purposes" and his spouse have the right to retain a life estate in
the property for a maximum of 25 years. However, if the appropriate Secretary finds that
"such use and occupancy is being exercised in a manner which conflicts with the purposes
of this chapter," he may terminate the right of use by tendering the owner the fair market
value of the remaining life estate. 16 U.S.C. § 1277(g)(2) (Supp. IV, 1969).
50 16 U.S.C. § 1277(a) (Supp. IV, 1969).
51 The use of scenic easements to preserve the natural environment in the river cor-
ridor is a technique that is now coming into widespread use. At one time it was thought
that the use of scenic easements might be hampered by the technical restrictions surround-
ing the common law of easements, covenants, and equitable servitudes. For example,
it has been suggested that the courts might not recognize a scenic easement because the
law does not recognize novel interests in land. See Cunningham, Scenic Easements in the
Highway Beautification Program, 45 DENVER Lj. 168, 174-77 (1968). However, negative
easements of view have been recognized in several states. See, e.g., Petersen v. Freidman,
162 Cal. App. 2d 245, 328 P.2d 264 (1958). Reported and unreported cases are collected and
discussed in 0. PLIMPTON, CONSERVATION EASEMENTS: LEGAL ANALYSIS OF CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS AS A METHOD OF PRIVATELY CONSERVING AND PRESERVING LAND 6-8 (undated
mimeo prepared for the Nature Conservancy, Washington, D.C.). One court has held that
the legislature may authorize the condemnation of scenic easements. Kamrowski v. State,
31 Wis. 2d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 (1966). The express authorization to acquire scenic ease-
ments contained in the Act should be read as a legislative decision to create new forms of
property interests unencumbered by common law technical restrictions that have no present
utility.
52 Hearings on H.R. 8416, supra note 47, at 114. S. 119 and other House bills would
have restricted condemnation to a maximum of 320 acres per mile. See id. at 128-29 for a
comparison of the condemnation provisions in the House and Senate bills.
53 See id. at 143.
54 16 U.S.C. § 1277(b) (Supp. IV, 1969). As previously mentioned, this restriction was
placed in the legislation by Senator Morse of Oregon to protect landowners on the
Rogue River, where the largest percentage of land on a river, 83%, is in private owner-
ship.
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diction "has in force and applicable to such lands a duly adopted, valid
zoning ordinance that conforms to the purposes of this chapter."55 The
appropriate Secretary may issue guidelines for a zoning ordinance cover-
ing such matters as the prohibition of commercial and industrial uses
and frontage and setback requirements. Although the wording of the
statute is somewhat vague, the intent is to give the Secretary of the
Interior the power to condemn if he does not approve a local govern-
mental unit's zoning plan. This provision represents a victory for the
government, for earlier drafts of the legislation would have prohibited
any condemnation."6 In our judgment the first limitation is highly
undesirable, for it unduly constrains the government's power to pre-
serve or enhance a river corridor consistent with its classification. Where
there are large commercial uses, such as a resort, the fifty percent lim-
itation may perpetuate a higher level of development than is optimal
under the river's classification.57
B. Corridor Management
1. Statutory Guidelines and Administrative Interpretations
The basic management philosophy of the Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act is contained in the requirement that an included river be classified
as one of the three types. Classification determines the intensity of
shoreland development and the types of recreational uses permitted in
the corridor;58 requiring it is therefore a legislative attempt to ensure
55 Id. § 1277(c).
56 See Hearings on H.R. 8416, supra note 47, at 128-29, for a comparison of the
condemnation provisions in the House and Senate bills.
57 Section 7 might be challenged on constitutional grounds, since the right of
Congress to delegate the power of eminent domain is circumscribed by the fifth amend-
ment requirement that the taking be for a public purpose. In light of a dictum in Berman
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), however, it is unlikely that such a challenge would be sus-
tained by the Supreme Court:
The concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it represents
are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the
power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as
well as healthy, spacious as well as clean ....
Id. at 33 (citation omitted). Justice Douglas's emphasis in Berman on the detailed planning
procedure in the urban renewal statute involved there indicates that the Court may still
review the manner in which delegated eminent domain power is to be exercised. The
legislation appears satisfactory in this respect: Congress has chosen not to exercise the full
scope of its power of eminent domain, but has put fairly rigid limits on the amount of
land that can be taken and the purpose for which the power is to be exercised. Sufficient
advance planning for each river is required so that the possibility of selective takings
operating in an unconstitutionally discriminatory manner has been minimized.
58 Segments of the same river may be in different classifications. The consequences of
a three-fold classification scheme are illustrated by the Rogue River development plan.
In the wild river area, demand for use will probably be greater than the area can accom-
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that preservation values are not destroyed by supposed "compatible"
uses. 59 Limitation is necessary, since there will be constant pressures
for high-density recreational development and a wider range of per-
mitted activities on even the more remote rivers as the lower, more
developed reaches of streams included in the system are used to capacity.
The Act charges the two Secretaries to so administer river systems
as to emphasize their "esthetic, scenic, historic, archeologic, and scientific
features." 60 These guidelines are superimposed over more general dele-
gations of management authority under which public lands are admin-
istered. Lands under the Secretary of Agriculture's jurisdiction are
administered under "the general statutory authorities relating to the
national forests in such manner as he deems appropriate to carry out
modate and still retain its primitive character. Therefore, capacity will be limited to that
which is consistent with the management objectives of the area. No more facilities will be
provided than are necessary to accommodate the established capacity, even though there is
more usable land available. On the other hand, the recreational scenic river areas have
only limited amounts of land available for development. Demand will probably be greater
than it is physically possible to provide facilities for.
In the wild river area, public camping spots will be developed which are of a
primitive nature, are accessible only by trail or boat, and provide simple comfort and
convenience facilities as well as facilities for the protection of the site and environment
or the safety of the user. Scenic river area sites will provide for some user comfort along
with site protection and safety. Sites in the recreational river areas will provide a wide
range of recreation opportunities consistent with the objectives for these river areas. Some
will be accessible only by trail or boat and provide facilities primarily for site protection,
while others will be accessible by paved roads and provide for considerable user comfort
and convenience. Campgrounds, picnic grounds, boat ramps, and facilities for public
information and interpretation will all be provided in the recreational river areas.
59 A useful discussion of the need to consider ecological considerations in development
decisions similar to those which will be made under the Act is found in F. DARLING &
N. EICHHORN, MAN AND NATURE IN THE NATIONAL PARKs: RF.LECrIoNS ON POLICY (2d ed.
1969).
60 Each component of the national wild and scenic rivers system shall be ad-
ministered in such manner as to protect and enhance the values which caused it
to be included in said system without, insofar as is consistent therewith, limiting
other uses that do not substantially interfere with public use and enjoyment of
these values. In such administration primary emphasis shall be given to protecting
its esthetic, scenic, historic, archeologic, and scientific features. Management plans
for any such component may establish varying degrees of intensity for its protec-
tion and development, based on the special attributes of the area.
16 U.S.C. § 1281(a) (Supp. IV, 1969). A similar provision exists for lands within designated
wilderness areas:
Any portion of a component of the national wild and scenic rivers system
that is within the national wilderness preservation system [Id. § 1132], as estab-
lished by or pursuant to the Wilderness Act [id. §§ 1131-36 (1964)], shall be
subject to the provisions of both the Wilderness Act and its chapter with
respect to preservation of such river and its immediate environment, and in case
of conflict between the provisions of the Wilderness Act and this chapter the more
restrictive provisions shall apply.
Id. § 1281(b) (Supp. IV, 1969).
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the purposes of this chapter."61 The basic statute will thus be the
Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960.62 Lands administered by the
Secretary of the Interior through the National Park Service become part
of that system. 63 If the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act conflicts with a park
system act, the more restrictive provision applies. If the land is not part
of the national park system, the Secretary may administer it under
"such general statutory authorities ... available to him for recreation
and preservation purposes and for the conservation and management of
natural resources as he deems appropriate to carry out the purposes of
this chapter." 64
In light of experience with the Forest and Park Service enabling
legislation, these provisions give the two Secretaries ample discretion
to control the number of users and types of uses allowed in each of
the three river categories.05 In McMichael v. United States,66 defendants
were convicted of violating a Forest Service regulation that prohibited
the use of motorbikes on trails in primitive areas of the national for-
ests.67 In sustaining the regulation the court held it to be a reasonable
61 Id. § 1281(d).
62 Id. §§ 528-31 (1964). Prior laws are not, however, superseded.
63 Id. § 1281(c) (Supp. IV, 1969).
64 Id.
65 Even though the courts refuse to alter administrative interpretations of enabling
'authority that have been crystallized into policy positions, the agency is generally free
to change its position in light of new conceptions of its role. An example of the increased
weight that can be given to ecological conditions is a recent opinion from the Department
of the Interior authorizing the termination of a grazing permit in the Organ Pipe Cactus
National Monument. Memorandum from the Solicitor to the Secretary of the Interior,
Legality of Grazing Permits in Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument [M-36734], April 5,
1968. Cattle had been grazing in the area long before it was designated a national
monument in 1937. At that time a wildlife specialist warned that the cattle were endanger-
ing the plant life of the monument, but a grazing permit was issued. Subsequent permits
were made revocable at the discretion of Director of the National Park Service, but,
despite constant complaints from naturalists about the adverse impact of the cattle on
the monument, were routinely renewed. Finally, in 1965, ecologists bluntly told the Park
Service "that the point of irreversible alterations to the Sonoran ecosystem is dangerously
near and could not be satisfactorily forestalled simply by a reduction in the number of
animals grazing." Id. at 11. Prior departmental policy was reversed, and the Solicitor
advised the Park Service that it had not only the power but the duty to revoke the permit
because the grazing was inconsistent with the primary purpose of the monument. Cases
such as this raise complex estoppel problems beyond the scope of this article. See K. DAvis,
ADMINismTIATvE LAW § 17 (1958).
66 355 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1965). See also Jones v. Freeman, 400 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1968)
(recognizing an implied power to promulgate regulations to protect forest resources).
67 See 28 Fed. Reg. 5617 (1963), amending 36 C.F.R. §§ 251.20-21(a) (1963). The
regulation was enacted under 16 U.S.C. § 551 (1964), which authorizes the Secretary of
Agriculture to "make such rules and regulations . . . as will insure the objectives of
such reservations, namely, to regulate their occupancy and use and to preserve the forests
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means of providing the public with a wilderness area and thus within
the Secretary's discretion. "The choice of what shall be preserved is an
administrative choice in which geographical and topographical con-
siderations are certainly germane but hardly are subject to judicial
review."68
If the Secretaries have the necessary power, the question remains
whether they will exercise it wisely. If the scenic rivers are managed as
general recreation areas, as some preferred during the hearings, the val-
ues for which they are preserved may be lost. For example, will boating,
motor-boating, and water skiing be allowed on wild or scenic rivers?69
Will overnight accommodations be allowed in recreational river areas?
As a representative of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation testified,
"[t]he bill is very open on that."70 Congressional reports are not pre-
cise, stating only that development should "be kept on the modest
side." 71
The best indication of the management policies that the federal
government intends to follow in permitting stream uses and develop-
ment along the banks is the testimony of the Director of the Bureau
thereon from destruction .. ... See also United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29
(1940) ("The power over public land thus entrusted to Congress [under U.S. CONsr. art. 4,
§ 3, c. 2] is without limitations').
68 355 F.2d at 286. The Bureau of Land Management, which will administer the
Rio Grande, "will exclude, except under certain prescribed conditions . . . the use of
motorized equipment and aircraft within the boundaries of the Wild River Area." 34 Fed.
Reg. 17207, 17209 (1969) (development plans for Rio Grande National Wild and Scenic
River, New Mexico). See also id. at 15605, 15607 (development plan for Eleven Point Wild
and Scenic River Area).
69 Congressman Fraser of Minnesota suggested that powerboats and waterskiing might
be allowed on a scenic but not a wild river. Hearings on H.R. 8416, supra note 47, at 83.
70 Id. at 153. He also qualified his remarks:
Well, I think that the purposes are to preserve segments of America's rivers
in as nearly a natural state as we can, but permitting a minimum type of recrea-
tion development-trails, boating, but generally in the wilderness areas they
prohibit motorboats and also in a substantial portion of the Boundary Waters
Canoe Area. In some places you would have to use motorboats for safety.
But I do not think you would have the extent of recreation development and
facilities that you normally contemplate in a national recreation area. You would
not have that.
You would not have overnight accommodations and this sort of thing. Hope-
fully, you would have this sort of development on private land outside.
You might have a simple type of picnic facilities, and this sort of thing. I
think my figures indicate that the developments contemplated here run about a
third of the cost of acquisition. The normal ratio between development and the
cost of acquiring a recreation area is about 2 to 1.
What is contemplated for scenic river areas generally is a very simple type
of development.
Id. at 165.
71 H.R. REP. No. 1623, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1968).
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of Outdoor Recreation before the Subcommittee on National Parks
and Recreation of the House Interior Committee:
From a scenic river standpoint emphasis would be placed on
providing principally those facilities that are oriented to active
visitor use and enjoyment of the river. This would include such
facilities as access points, campsites, picnic areas, and interpretive
areas. In the case of rivers flowing through areas in which the
natural scene has remained unchanged, development would be
minimal to retain the integrity of the natural state. In those in-
stances where the rivers flow through designated wilderness areas
no development will be permitted unless expressly allowed by the
Wilderness Act. Wherever possible visitor goods and services would
be provided outside the boundaries of the rivers by private initia-
tive in the nearby communities.
Existing farm and ranch operations normally would be con-
sistent with the scenic river concept. Likewise, existing well
managed timber operations would be compatible, except that clear-
cutting of trees on the river edge may in some instances be too
disruptive to the natural scene. Existing mineral activities would
be compatible except where they tend to destroy esthetic qualities
or pollute the river. Existing cabins, summer homes and other
recreation oriented commercial developments may be compatible
with scenic river objectives if they do not seriously detract from
the esthetic features and qualities of the river.
Certain uses would be discouraged that are disruptive to the
natural or pastoral river scene such as residential sub-divisions,
industrial plants, motels, and gas stations. The construction of
dams, river channelization, closely paralleled roads and utility lines
would be discouraged unless compelling reasons exist why they
should be permitted.72
To date, published management plans have been consistent with these
standards. For example, outboard motors will be restricted in the
Eleven Point Wild and Scenic River, and, in the Middle Fork Clear-
water Wild and Scenic River, "visitor use will be distributed or limited
as necessary to prevent loss of river values. 1 78
2. Judicial Review of Corridor Management Decisions
The Act is silent on the question of whether judicial review of
internal departmental management decisions can be obtained. It has
72 Hearings on H.R. 8416, supra note 47, at 165.
73 34 Fed. Reg. 15605, 15607 (1969) (development plan for Eleven Point Wild and
Scenic River Area); id. at 15565, 15566 (development plan for Middle Fork Clearivater
Wild and Scenic River Area). Development plans for the other "instant" rivers in the
wild and scenic rivers system can be found in id. at 17206 (Rio Grande), id. at 15572
(Salmon), and id. at 15306 (Wolf and Saint Croix).
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been thought that there is no need to provide for judicial review of
decisions such as these because the public interest is represented by the
government. But the performance of the federal government in arrest-
ing environmental degradation suggests that non-governmental checks
on decision making are necessary, and citizen groups may have a useful
role to play in monitoring the administration of the Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act. The potential effectiveness of citizen participation is en-
hanced because the Act attempts to set standards for the exercise of
discretion. The historic practice of allowing administrators to formulate
substantive policies within broad statutory guidelines has not been
followed. It should be possible for the courts to develop criteria from
the legislation under which administrative decisions can be reviewed,
thus removing a previous constraint on judicial review of internal
public land management decisions.
If legislation does not provide for judicial review, it may be ob-
tained for action which is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law .. " except where "agency
action is by law committed to agency discretion." 74 Some decisions sug-
gest that the courts might apply this exception to the Act.75 But judicial
review may be more readily available than under this standard; as a
result of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,78 courts are beginning to
hold that there is a presumption of jurisdiction under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, a presumption which can be overcome only by a
clear showing that Congress did not intend to allow judicial review.77
This presumption is now being extended to government resource man-
agement decisions where the authorizing statute provides no specific
provision for judicial review.78 We believe that the Wild and Scenic
74 Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 706 (Supp. IV, 1969).
75 See, e.g., Frost v. Garrison, 201 F. Supp. 389 (D. Wyo. 1962). See also Reich, The
Public and the Nation's Forests, 50 CALiF. L. REv. 381, 393-96 (1962). A possible barrier
to the review of corridor decisions is the doctrine of sovereign immunity. For an excellent
discussion of its application, see Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative
Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdic-
tion, and Parties Defendant, 68 MicH. L. REv. 389, 396-436 (1970). But see Plaintiffs' Brief
in the Project Rulison Case, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 761, 786-802 (1970).
78 387 US. 136 (1967). For a discussion of the implications of this case for original
lawsuits initiated by citizens groups, see Sax, Public Rights in Public Resources: The
Citizen's Role in Conservation and Development, in UNivaRsrry oF TExAs LAW SCHOOL
WATER, LAW CONFERENCE: CONTEmPORARY DEVFLOPMENTS IN WATER LAW (C. Johnson &
S. Lewis eds. 1970).
7t See Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F2d 1 (2d Cir. 1966); Road Review League,
Town of Bedford v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
78 Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y.
1969). A most significant decision in this direction is Parker v. United States, 309 F. Supp.
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Rivers Act should be construed to create enforceable public rights and
thus permit judicial review of corridor management decisions.
Assuming that judicial review of management decisions is possible,
who has standing to seek such review? Until 1966 courts held that
groups of private citizens had no standing because they had no legally
protected rights under federal statutes.7 9 Since Scenic Hudson Preserva-
tion Conference v. FPC,s0 however, courts have begun to hold that
citizen groups have standing to protest the application of federal stat-
utes when there is a threat of environmental degradation."' Scenic
Hudson held that under a section of the Federal Power Act requiring
the Federal Power Commission to consider the impact of projects on
the recreational potential of rivers, a non-profit organization consisting
of conservation groups and towns in the vicinity of a planned project
was an aggrieved party. The groups in Scenic Hudson were parties
to the licensing proceeding, but Scenic Hudson was extended in Road
Review League, Town of Bedford v. Boyd82 to give a similar group of
593 (D. Colo. 1970). A group of citizens brought suit to prevent the Forest Service from
selling timber on land adjacent to a designated primitive area on the grounds that the
land had not been studied for possible inclusion in the wilderness system. The court
reasoned that the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b) (1964), "leaves no doubt that at
least as to those contiguous areas which are predominantly of wilderness value, the
decision to classify or not to classify them as wilderness must remain open through the
Presidential level." 309 F. Supp. at 598 (emphasis in original). To implement this statutory
policy the court held that the question of which areas were suitable for wilderness classifi-
cation and must be studied under the Act was a question of law and thus subject to
judicial review. The timber sale was enjoined pending completion of a study. The court
rested its decision on the theory that the "substantially objective criteria" contained in
the Wilderness Act removed "a great deal of... discretion from the Secretary of Agriculture
and the Forest Service" (id. at 597), and provided a set of standards for the exercise of
judicial review. The opinion provides a strong precedent for use of the river classification
and land management criteria as standards for judicial review of corridor development
decisions. See generally Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for
Better Definition of Standards, 75 HARv. L. REv. 863, 1005, 1263 (1962).
The Parker rationale may be limited to cases in which a court decides it is necessary
to move the problem from one decisional authority to another. See Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine In Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MiCH. L. R-v.
473, 556-65 (1970). If it is recognized, however, that the function of the courts in these
types of natural resource decisions is to provide the public with a means by which they
can monitor important, but little publicized, government decisions, Parker will be read to
apply to the administration of acts such as the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968.
79 See, e.g., Green St. Ass'n v. Daley, 373 F.2d I (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 932
(1967).
80 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
81 Courts seem to be moving rapidly to an acceptance of Professor Jaffe's position
that the existence of a Hohfeldian claim has no relation to the case or controversy require-
ment or the political question doctrine. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions:
The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968).
82 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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plaintiffs standing to bring an independent action under the Federal
Highways Act.
Scenic Hudson and Road Review League may not solve all prob-
lems of standing, since plaintiffs in those cases were parties from the
locality of the project. Scenic Hudson held that "those who by their
activities and conduct have exhibited a special interest in such areas"
have standing;83 the court found that the towns had a direct economic
interest because transmission lines connected with the project might
reduce tax revenues, and that a hiking conservation group had an in-
terest because it might lose the use of trails it owned in the area. The
remoteness of many wild and scenic rivers makes it unlikely that local
groups will be formed to challenge the. management of an area under
the Act. Litigation is most likely to be instigated by state or national
conservation groups who cannot always demonstrate a prior interest in
the affected area.
In Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe,84 the court
held that the Sierra Club, a national conservation organization that had
"no personal economic claim to assert," had standing. On the basis of
Scenic Hudson and Road Review League, the court concluded:
The rule, therefore, is that if the statutes involved in the
controversy are concerned with the protection of natural, historic,
and scenic resources, then a congressional intent exists to give
standing to groups interested in these factors and who allege that
these factors are not being properly considered by the agency.85
This is a correct reading of Scenic Hudson. Judge Hays's statement that
"although a 'case' or 'controversy' which is otherwise lacking cannot
be created by statute, a statute may create new interests or rights and
thus give standing to one who would otherwise be barred by the lack
of 'case' or 'controversy,' "8 indicates that standing is a function of the
purpose of the statute rather than the impact of the decision on the
party bringing the suit. The broad rationale of Scenic Hudson is that
those with a serious concern with environmental quality have a useful
role to play in resource management decision making.
Future courts may use the constitutional requirement of a case or
controversy to screen non-local challenging groups, but not in the
traditional way. The standard developed in Scenic Hudson and the
statement in Citizens Committee that groups "interested" in conserva-
83 354 F.2d at 616.
84 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
85 Id. at 1092 (footnote omitted).
86 354 F.2d at 615.
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tion have standing suggest that courts will require an evidentiary
showing on such questions as the history of a group's involvement in
environmental problems, the range and depth of its concerns and ac-
tivities, and its ability to bring significant new data and alternative
proposals to the attention of the decision maker.8 7 The emphasis in
questions of standing should be on the group's general sophistication
in matters of environmental quality. Judging from the experts who
have been allowed to testify in these cases, however, it seems probable
that Scenic Hudson will be read to allow national conservation groups
with no prior knowledge of the specific area to challenge a decision
made under the Act.
C. Mining Limitations
Section 9 provides, with certain exceptions, that the Act does not
limit the application of the mining and mineral leasing laws. 88 The
mining laws allow any American citizen who discovers valuable mineral
deposits on the public domain to locate and patent his claim and ac-
quire title to the minerals.8 9 Other resources, such as oil and gas,
may be extracted from the public domain under provisions of the
mineral leasing laws.90 Claims may also be located on national forest
lands that were reserved from the public domain. 91 Thus a western
river that passes through the public domain or national forests may
be subjected to mining development even after inclusion in the na-
87 See South Hill Neighborhood Ass'n v. Romney, 38 U.S.L.W. 2413 (6th Cir. Nov. 24,
1969). An association was formed to protest an urban renewal project that would destroy
historic buildings in the center of Lexington, Kentucky. The buildings had been placed
in the National Register of Historic Places six months after the urban renewal authority
acquired title to the buildings. Finding that "[n]one of the plaintiffs, though informed of
the urban renewal plan's alternative use for historic preservation, submitted a proposal
for the development of the area," the court denied standing to contest the demolition.
"The plaintiffs have not sufficiently engaged in the administrative process to show a special
interest in the controversy so as to be included among those parties aggrieved or adversely
affected by agency action." Id. The case seems to deny standing not because of the status
of the parties, who were residcnts of the area, but because of the quality of their participa-
tion in decision making. The burden to come forward with alternative development plans
is a logical one to apply in a case such as South Hill because most historic preservation
schemes flounder on the issue of finding economically feasible uses for the buildings. It
should not, however, be required in a corridor development challenge, since the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act should be read to contain a presumption against intensive development.
Thus it should be sufficient to allow qualified plaintiffs to question the need for the devel-
opment in light of probable adverse impacts on the ecological balance in the corridor.
88 16 U.S.C. § 1280 (Supp. IV, 1969).
89 30 U.S.C. § 26 (1964).
0 See, e.g., id. § 228.
91 16 U.S.C. § 482 (1964).
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tional system. The most important exception to this rule is the complete
withdrawal from mineral development of lands within one-quarter of
a mile of the bank of any river designated for management under the
wild category. Classification of a river can thus be an administrative
decision of great economic and environmental importance.
On scenic and recreational rivers, and beyond a quarter-mile from
the bank of a wild river, the Act provides that claims perfected and
leases let in a river corridor after its inclusion in the system may be
operated subject to regulations designed to protect the natural values
of the river. Prior claims and leases are not subject to such regulation.
When they appear, the regulations will probably resemble mining re-
strictions applicable to national wilderness areas under the 1964 wil-
derness legislation,92 which cover such matters as access routes, tree
removal, drainage provisions, and post-mining restoration.93
IV
RESTRICTIONS ON FEDERAL WATER RESOURCES PROGRAMS
INCONSISTENT WITH THE ACT
A common criticism of our natural resources management agencies
is that neither their historic missions nor their current organizational
structures are conducive to increased consideration of the ecological
impact of important management decisions. Lack of coordination among
federal agencies94 and the development bias of federal programs have
combined to ensure that preservation values have been insufficiently
92 Id. §§ 1131-36; 36 C.F.R. § 251.83 (1969).
23 It does not appear that these regulations could directly prevent the use of disrup-
tive techniques, such as open-pit mining. See Hubbard, Ah, Wilderness! (But What About
Access and Prospecting), 15 ROCKY MT. MINEaAL L. INsT. 585 (1969); Comment, The
Wilderness Act and Mining: Some Proposals for Conservation, 47 ORE. L. R-v. 447, 452-58
(1968).
94 Existing coordination agencies are deficient because
[n]one of these bodies are [sic] constituted to look at man-environment relations
as a whole; none provide [sic] an overview; none appear [sic] fully to answer the
need for a system to enable the President, the Congress, and the electorate to
consider alternative solutions to environmental problems.
joint House-Senate Colloquium To Discuss a National Policy for the Environment, Hear-
ings Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs and the House Comm. on
Science and Astronautics, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 104 (1968). See S. REP. No. 296, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 15-17 (1969), and 115 CoNG. REc. S 1780-1794 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 1969) (re-
marks of Senator Jackson on S. 1075), for a perceptive discussion of deficiencies in existing
agency structure and practice. The history of attempted coordination of federal water
resources activities is described in Fesler, National Water Resources Administration, 22
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 444 (1957).
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represented in water resources planning and programs. For example,
the Federal Power Commission has the power to deny a license for
a dam if fish, wildlife, or scenic values are threatened, but the power
has been exercised only once.9 5 The United States Army Corps of
Engineers has recognized preservation values only when local political
pressure has been organized against a dam.
The National Environmental Policy Act of 196990 is a partial
response to this criticism. The Act states federal environmental policy
as reflecting "the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government
to use all practical means, consistent with other essential considerations
of national policy, to ... enhance the quality of renewable resources
and approach the maximum attainable recycling of depletable re-
sources."97 It then attempts to enforce this and other policy statements
by requiring that "to the fullest extent possible" federal laws and ad-
ministrative policies shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with
the Act.98 The Act will be administered by presidential appointees
from within the government, especially from the Department of the
Interior, who have shown a high level of interest in limiting develop-
ment of selected natural areas. Hopefully, precise policy standards will
force federal agencies to modify programs that contribute to environ-
mental degradation.
In the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Congress attempted to ensure
preservation of included rivers by restricting projects and programs that
are inconsistent with the Act.99 Senate drafts of the legislation simply
95 Namekagon Hydro Co. v. FPC, 216 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1954). The Department of
the Interior's Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife has often appeared in FPC licensing
hearings, but its recommendations are not binding on the Commission. See Tarlock,
Preservation of Scenic Rivers, 55 KY. L.J. 745, 769-83 (1967), for a discussion of conflicts
between the Department of the Interior and the Federal Power Commission. For a dis-
cussion of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, see Tippy, supra note 14, at 262-64.
96 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-47 (Supp. March 1970).
97 Id. § 4331(b)(6).
98 Specifically, federal legislative proposals and "other major Federal actions" must
include a statement on (1) the environmental impact of the proposal, (2) any adverse
environmental impacts which cannot be avoided, (3) alternatives to the proposed action,
(4) the relationship between'the short-term uses of the environment and the maintenance
and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (5) any irreversible and irretrievable
commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action. Id. § 4332.
99 16 U.S.C. § 1278 (Supp. IV, 1969). The relationship between reorientation of any
agency's mission and organizational restructuring has been concisely stated by political
scientist L. K. Caldwell: "Mhe task of coordination has little significance beyond con-
siderations of economy and efficiency, unless undertaken against a more explicit and
authoritative standard for social goals." Caldwell, Administrative Possibilities for Environ-
mental Control, in FuTURE ENvIRONmENTs or NoRTH AMERICA 666-67 (F. Darling & J.
Milton eds. 1966).
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prohibited the Federal Power Commission from licensing a "dam or
other project work .. . in any wild river area except as specifically
authorized by the Congress."' 00 A much more comprehensive mora-
torium on federal construction and licensing activity was included in
Congressman Aspinall's 1967 bill; 101 with one important provision
added in conference, this restriction appears in the legislation as en-
acted.
The Aspinall revision, section 7 of the Act, protects "instant"
rivers, future additions, and section 5 "study" rivers. 0 2 The Federal
Power Commission is prohibited from licensing the construction of
"any dam, water conduit, reservoir, powerhouse, transmission line, or
other project works under the Federal Power Act, as amended, on or
directly affecting" a section 3 or 5 river. Other federal departments,
such as the Corps of Engineers, are prohibited from licensing or fund-
ing "any water resources project that would have a direct and adverse
effect on the values for which such river" was or might be designated
under section 3 or 5.103 The appropriate Secretary is entitled to sixty
100 S. 1446, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(a) (1965). The necessity of imposing a moratorium
on Federal Power Commission licenses is underscored by a 1968 report prepared by the
Commission for the House Interior Committee, which listed 25 potential conventional
hydroelectric sites on "instant" and 53 on potential streams. H.R. REP. No. 1623, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1968).
101 H.R. 8416, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a) (1967).
102 16 US.C. § 1278 (Supp. IV, 1969).
103 The term "water resources project" is not defined in the Act or the legislative
history, but the Interior Department has construed it broadly. The Corps of Engineers
has denied a dredge-and-fill permit that would have substantially altered the banks and
flow of a § 5 "study" river at the request of the Interior Department. Based on the policy
of the legislation and § 15(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1286(b) (Supp. IV, 1969), which defines a free-
flowing stream as "existing or flowing in natural condition without impoundment, diver-
sion, straightening, rip-rapping, or other modification of the waterway," the Department
takes the position that "a water resource project can best be defined as any type of con-
struction which would result in any change in the free-flowing characteristics of a partic-
ular river." Memorandum, U.S. Department of Interior, Act of October 2, 1968, Wild
and Scenic Rivers Act [M-36777], February 7, 1969, at 5. See also Hearings on H.R. 8416,
supra note 47, at 115 (sewage treatment plant might be included within the phrase); H.R.
RaP. No. 1623, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1968).
The significance of the secretarial veto can be appreciated in the light of past Corps-
Interior conflicts over dredge-and-fill permits. Under the Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Act of 1958, 16 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1964), the Corps is required only to consult with the
Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife and the state wildlife administrator before issuing
a permit. In 1967 the Interior Department sought to limit this power over permits.
Hearings on H.R. 25 Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 21, 479 (1967).
While the Corps takes the position that it has the power to deny a permit for purely
ecological considerations, a federal district judge has held that it does not. Zabel v. Tabb,
296 F. Supp. 764 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
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days to make his determination. The impact of a proposed project
on the system may thus be explored at the early stages of planning
and design, before the water bureaucracy irrevocably commits itself.
It is not clear whether the secretarial veto applies only to projects
within the boundary of a section 3 or 5 river or also applies to the
nonincluded reaches and tributaries. After providing for the veto, the
conference committee added the following sentence:
Nothing contained in the foregoing sentence, however, shall pre-
clude licensing of, or assistance to, developments below or above
a wild, scenic or recreational river area or on any stream tributary
thereto which will not invade the area or unreasonably diminish
the scenic, recreational, and fish and wildlife values present in the
area .... 104
The legislative history indicates that this sentence was added at the
insistence of the then Secretary of Agriculture, Orville Freeman, to
broaden his discretion in approving watershed projects such as small
flood control, fish and wildlife, and rural water supply reservoirs.1 05
He was concerned that if all projects having a direct effect on an in-
cluded river were prohibited it would not be possible to distinguish
compatible projects, such as a reservoir that could be operated to
stabilize the flow of an included stream, from incompatible projects.
It should also be noted that the Federal Power Commission's jurisdic-
tion is expressly restricted on system rivers and their non-included
reaches and tributaries. Thus, although the Act is somewhat vague,
the intent of Congress seems to be not to limit the secretarial veto to
projects within the boundary of a river area. 0 6 The clause allowing
projects on non-included reaches and tributaries should be read as
merely specifying the findings the Secretary must make to exercise
his veto. He cannot veto a project merely because it would have a
direct effect on a river area; he must also find that it "will ... invade
104 16 US.C. § 1278(a) (Supp. IV, 1969).
105 H.R. REP. No. 1623, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33 (1968).
106 This problem was considered in the House when the legislation was passed, but
it was not resolved. Representative Aspinall explained that the clause "is to prevent the
blocking of development that does not adversely affect the scenic river segment when
that development is above or below the designated scenic river area," but failed to state
who would decide if the project would have an adverse impact on the river area. 114
CONG. REc. 26594 (1968).
The Interior Department naturally takes the position that it has a veto over projects
outside the designated area. Memorandum, supra note 103, at 7. Congress is not, however,
precluded from authorizing projects outside the boundaries of the scenic river, and judging
from the House debates, it does not consider the Act as a significant self-imposed con-
straint on authorizing future projects such as flood control reservoirs. 114 CONG. REc.
26593-95 (1968).
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... or unreasonably diminish" the scenic, recreation, and wildlife values
of the area.
The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act may have consequences for water
resources planning even on rivers not directly protected. Section 5(d)
of the Act, which directs all federal agencies to consider preservation
of a river as an alternative to other proposed projects, is a statement
of policy that may be enforced not only through comprehensive plan-
ning, but also by the judiciary. In Scenic Hudson Preservation Con-
ference v. FPC10 7 the Second Circuit reversed the issuance of a pump
storage plant license and remanded for further proceedings because the
Commission's record on alternative sources of power was inadequate.
Section 10(a) of the Federal Power Act requires the FPC to decide if
the project
will be best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or
developing a waterway or waterways for the use or benefit of inter-
state or foreign commerce, for the improvement and utilization
of water power development, and for other beneficial public uses,
including recreational purposes .... 108
The court held that section 10(a) imposed an affirmative duty on
the Commission to give greater attention to alternative means, less de-
structive of fish, wildlife, and scenic beauty, of generating power. In
Udall v. FPC09 the Commission issued a license for a public utility
over the objection of the Interior Department that the site should be
reserved for future federal development because a federal dam would
best be able to coordinate the use of a river for a variety of purposes,
including preservation of salmon. The Court reversed the FPC and
held that the Secretary of the Interior's request that the record be
opened so he could make a factual showing of the superiority of
federal development should have been granted. In a long dictum Jus-
tice Douglas questioned the need for any dam on the river-an issue
raised by none of the parties. Relying in part on the 1965 Anadromous
Fish Act," 0 he found the entire record insufficient on the question of
whether the dam would be in the public interest. He specified that in
reconsidering the license the Commission should consider "future
power demand and supply, alternate sources of power, the public in-
terest in preserving reaches of wild rivers and wilderness areas, the
07 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
108 16 US.C. § 803(a) (1964).
109 387 U.S. 428 (1967).
110 16 U.S.C. §§ 757a-f (Supp. IV, 1969).
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preservation of anadromous fish for commercial and recreational pur-
poses, and the protection of wildlife.""'1
The net effect of these decisions is to increase substantially the
burden of proof a development proponent is required to meet. Justi-
fication for shifting this burden of proof cannot be found in legislative
intent; Congress has never attempted to decide whether administrative
agencies are to prefer nondevelopment to development. The decisions
must stem from a recognition that the planning being done by existing
agencies is deficient. At the heart of current criticisms of the failure
of government to arrest environmental degradation is the allegation
that current planning is too narrow. Insufficient consideration is given
to the broader impacts of decisions and to alternative solutions. Udall
and Scenic Hudson compel an initiating agency to make a greater effort
to consider the impact of a decision on other parts of the total statutory
system, and, if conflict is found, to seek alternative solutions.
V
FEDERAL RIGHTS TO PROTECT THE FLOW OF THE
RIVER AND CONTROL POLLUTION
A. Application of the Reserved Rights Doctrine to Wild and Scenic
Rivers
The relationship between federal and state water law in the man-
agement of system rivers is set forth in sections 13(b)-(d) of the Act:
(b) Compensation for water rights.
The jurisdiction of the States and the United States over waters
of any stream included in a national wild, scenic or recreation river
area shall be determined by established principles of law. Under
the provisions of this chapter, any taking by the United States of a
water right which is vested under either State or Federal law at the
time such river is included in the national wild and scenic rivers
system shall entitle the owner thereof to just compensation. Nothing
in this chapter shall constitute an express or implied claim or denial
on the part of the Federal Government as to exemption from State
water laws.
(c) Reservation of waters for other purposes or in unnecessary
quantities prohibited.
Designation of any stream or portion thereof as a national wild,
scenic or recreational river area shall not be construed as a reserva-
tion of the waters of such streams for purposes other than those
ll 387 U.S. at 450.
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specified in this chapter, or in quantities greater than necessary to
accomplish these purposes.
(d) State jurisdiction over included streams.
The jurisdiction of the States over waters of any stream in-
cluded in a national wild, scenic or recreational river area shall be
unaffected by this chapter to the extent that such jurisdiction may
be exercised without impairing the purposes of this chapter or its
administration. 12
By providing that federal rights are to be determined "by estab-
lished principles of law," section 13(b) impliedly incorporates the line
of Supreme Court cases holding that state law inconsistent with federal
water programs may be supplanted by Congress.113 A federal program
subservient to state water law could readily be frustrated, for neither
the common law of riparian rights nor the western doctrine of prior
appropriation has had much regard for preservation of water for scenic
uses."1 4 The last two sentences of section 13(b) might suggest that state
water law is to control the management of system rivers, but this is
probably not the case: the second sentence merely provides for com-
pensating the holder of state-created rights impaired by a project,
while the final sentence is merely boilerplate, intended to have no
operative consequences. On the other hand, section 13(c) is a left-handed
assertion of the reserved rights doctrine, discussed below, and section
13(d) is a roundabout assertion of federal supremacy. Thus section 13
permits the federal government to administer wild and scenic rivers
unfettered by inconsistent state law.
The extent to which the government must compensate those whose
use of water is restricted by the establishment of a wild or scenic river
will often depend on the application of the reserved rights doctrine,
which holds that
upon the creation of a federal reservation on public domain-
whether by treaty, legislation, or Executive order-the reservation
has appurtenant to it the right to divert as much water from streams
112 16 U.S.C. §§ 1284(b)-(d) (Supp. IV, 1969).
113 E.g., First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. FPC, 328 US. 152 (1946).
114 Generally speaking, preservation of a river for scenic purposes is not a reasonable
riparian use. See F. MALONEY, S. PLACER & F. BALDWIN, WATER LAW AND ADmINIsTRATION:
THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE § 43 (1968). But see Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn.
477, 234 A.2d 825 (1967). In the West, courts have held that the right to a portion of a
river's flow cannot be appropriated for wildlife or recreational purposes because "ap-
propriation" requires a diversion of water from the streams. Colorado River Water Con.
servation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., 158 Colo. 331, 406 P.2d 798 (1965). For a
more extended discussion of the inadequacies of state law, see Tarlock, supra note 95,
at 749-69.
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within or bordering upon it as is necessary to serve the purposes
for which the reservation was created. ....
The reserved right, unlike state-created appropriative rights,
does not depend upon diversion from the stream and application
to beneficial use. The reserved right arises when the reservation is
established even though the water right is not exercised for decades
thereafter.115
The reserved rights doctrine derives from Winters v. United
States,116 in which the government sued to enjoin the construction and
maintenance of dams on the Milk River in Montana on the ground
that the dams would deprive an Indian reservation of the "riparian
and other rights" of the United States to the uninterrupted flow of
the river. The dams were to be built on land that was once part of the
reservation but was sold to the United States by treaty in 1888 and
opened for settlement. In 1898 defendants had entered on the land
and diverted water. Because neither the United States nor the Indians
had allegedly used the river's water before 1898, defendants argued
that they had perfected superior rights. The Supreme Court rejected
this argument and held that state-created rights perfected after the
date of the reservation were inferior to the Indian rights, which dated
from the 1888 treaty, even though the water might not be used until
some distant date in the future.
The constitutional basis for such reservation of rights by Congress
is somewhat obscure. In cases involving Indian reservations, the treaty
power is a possible source.117 It is clear, however, that the power is not
limited to Indian reservations created by treaty. The Supreme Court
upheld the doctrine in Arizona v. California"18 under "the broad powers
of the United States to regulate navigable waters under the Commerce
Clause and to regulate government lands under Art. IV, § 3, of the
Constitution."' 9 The Court ruled that the doctrine is applicable to
national forests and recreation areas created by Executive order or
congressional enactment, as well as to Indian reservations. 120 Although
there are no cases in point, it has been argued persuasively that federal
water rights should now apply to land purchased by the federal gov-
ernment as well as to land withdrawn by the government from the
115 Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. Rav. 1, 65 (1966) (footnote omitted).
116 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
117t See, e.g., United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
'118 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
119 Id. at 597-98.
120 Id. at 601.
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public domain.121 The power to reserve water is thus applicable to the
non-public domain states of the East and Midwest as well as to the
public domain states.
A major deficiency in the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act is its failure
to integrate reserved rights with state-created rights. 122 Congress left
two important questions unanswered.12 The first is the priority date
of the reserved right: does it date from the original withdrawal of the
public land from entry (or, in the case of non-public land, the original
date of acquisition), or does it date only from the time a river is included
within the system under section 3? The second question concerns the
quantity of the withdrawal.124
A reserved right is generally held to date from the time of with-
drawal of the land.125 Thus an appropriation of water by a private
landowner before use by the federal government but after the land
has been withdrawn or acquired, which would create a vested right
to the water under a state's prior appropriation doctrine, would not be
superior to the government's reserved rights. 126 The cases, however, have
not dealt with situations in which the use of water by the government
differs substantially from uses that might have been foreseen when the
land was purchased or withdrawn-as is the case with the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act. It is reasonable to expect one planning a water
project "to suppose that Indian reservations were entitled to some
irrigation water,' 127 but quite unreasonable to tell a water user on a
wilderness river that the government has decided to exercise its re-
served rights for a wild river and that he must abandon or limit his
use without compensation.
121 Corker, Water Rights and Federalism-The Western Water Rights Settlement
Bill of 1957, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 604, 612 (1957).
122 In an appropriation state, all state-created water rights obtained after withdrawal
of the land from entry are subordinated to the federal right. It has been suggested that
under a riparian system rights exercised subsequent to the withdrawal should also be
subordinated to the federal government. See Hanks, Peace West of the 98th Meridian-A
Solution to Federal-State Conflicts over Western Waters, 23 RUTGERs L. R!v. 33, 59-40 n.25
(1968). For a trenchant analysis of the difficulties of integrating reserved rights with
state law outside the public domain appropriation states, see Meyers, supra note 115, at
65-73.
123 There have been numerous congressional attempts to modify the reserved rights
doctrine. See Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts over Western Waters-A Decade of At-
tempted "Clarifying Legislation," 20 RUTGERS L. REv. 423 (1966).
124 Rights perfected under state law prior to the date of the reservation are, of
course, superior to reserved rights. Hunter v. United States, 388 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1967)
(water right perfected by grazing cattle in Death Valley National Monument long before
monument established).
125 Meyers, supra note 115, at 66.
126 Id. at 68.
127 Id. at 72.
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The special master in Arizona v. California approved a decree for
quantities necessary to fulfill the purposes for which national forests
and wildlife refuges were created.128 Even if this is read as limiting
relation back to uses consistent with the original purpose of the reser-
vation, it might be argued that a scenic rivers system falls within a
broad definition of the original purpose of many withdrawals-reserva-
tion of resources for public enjoyment. Such a result is undesirable
because it jeopardizes state-created rights used over a long period of
time. It seems clear that Congress did not intend to have wild and
scenic river flowage rights relate back to the date the land was with-
drawn or acquired, but it is not clear that state-created expectations will
be protected under the Act. In response to a question about the effect
of the legislation on state rights acquired before the legislation, 129
Representative Aspinall quoted from a Department of the Interior
report, which stated: "Enactment of the bill would not in any way
affect or impair any valid or existing water rights perfected under
state law."' 30 This is a reference to section 13(b), which provides that
"cany taking" of a right vested under state law must be compensated.
But if the federal government's right relates back, subsequently created
state rights may be diminished or destroyed without a "taking" under
the reserved rights doctrine, for the government is only "exercising"
its right. To further the intention of Congress, the courts should hold
that reserved rights apply only to uses foreseeable at the time of the
original withdrawal. 13' Establishment of a wild and scenic rivers system
128 873 U.S. at 601. The open-ended decree was first approved in United States v.
Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F2d 321, 341 (9th Cir. 1956). For a good discussion of
the broad discretion a court has in fixing reserved rights, see Note, Water in the Woods:
The Reserved-Rights Doctrine and National Forest Lands, 20 STAN. L. Rxv. 1187, 1189-93
(1968). The special master quantified the Indian rights on the basis of irrigable acreage.
Professor Meyers reports that the master justified his refusal to quantify the rights for
national forests, recreation areas, and fish and wildlife refuges because of "the lack of
evidence of ultimate water requirements, but then somewhat inconsistently said that, in
any event, the quantities were so small as to be de minimis, an observation that suggests
that no great harm would have come to the Government if he had quantified the claims."
Meyers, supra note 115, at 72.
129 114 CONG. REc. 26594 (1968).
130 Id. The Interior Department report states that the bill
preserves the status quo with respect to the law of water rights, and makes clear
that the designation of a stream or portion thereof as a scenic river area is not
to be considered a reservation of waters for purposes other than those specified
in the bill, or in quantities greater than necessary to accomplish these purposes.
H.R. REP. No. 1623, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26 (1968).
131 The amount of water to which the Indians are entitled does not depend oil their
needs at the time of the reservation. In one case the court said it could extend "to the
ultimate needs of the Indians as those needs and requirements should grow to keep pace
with the development of Indian agriculture upon the reservation." United States v.
Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1956). The case held, however, that
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should be found unforeseeable, for only within the last few years has
comprehensive preservation of a river's flow for scenic, recreational,
and wildlife purposes been considered an appropriate federal objec-
tive.132 The priority date should therefore be the date a stream is made
either a section 3 or 5 river.
The only quantitative limitation on the government's power to
reserve water is that the amount reserved must be no greater than re-
quired to accomplish the purposes of the Act. This is really no
limitation at all, because the courts have not required that reserved
rights be quantified in a suit to establish them. Open-ended decrees
have been approved for national forests and wildlife areas, enabling
the government to exercise its rights as the need for the water arises.
Development plans for the rivers include provisions such as "[o]ptimum
flows for environmental needs are to be reserved,"'13 but the Act pro-
vides no requirement or procedure for the quantification of these
rights. The Departments of Interior and Agriculture have no present
plans to quantify their flowage claims, but plan to protect them by
enjoining diversions that, in their judgment, impair the management
of the system.'34 This deficiency may impede state planning because
the extent of future federal claims cannot be known. Even though un-
reserved water remains available under section 13(c), users have no way
of determining the amount. This problem may not be particularly im-
portant, however, because the portions of the stream included in the
system are generally in the upper reaches, so that reserved water will
be available for downstream uses. Furthermore, unlike the case of
Indian reservations, national forests, and other recreation areas, the
amount of flow necessary to maintain the qualities of a river is likely
to remain constant rather than expand over time. Thus, despite the
unwillingness of the federal government to quantify the withdrawal,
state development planning may not be unduly hampered by the Act.
B. Control of Water Pollution
The Act contains only a brief and vague reference to the need for
controlling water pollution in the wild and scenic river system. Section
12(c) directs the administrator of each river in the system to "cooperate
a 1908 agreement approved by the Under Secretary of Interior and white users on the
stream should be upheld.
132 See Note, supra note 128, at 1197-99.
133 34 Fed. Reg. 15565, 15566 (1969) (development plan for Middle Fork Clear-
water Wild and Scenic River Area).
134 Telephone conversation with Bernard Meyer, Office of the Solicitor, US. Depart-
ment of the Interior, Jan. 19, 1970.
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with the Secretary of the Interior and with the appropriate State water
pollution control agencies for .the purpose of eliminating or diminishing
the pollution of waters of the river."'31 5 More detailed legislation would
have been inhibited by the committee jurisdictional problem for this
legislation emerged from Interior and Insular Affairs rather than Pub-
lic Works. In any event, control of the lands along a river in the
system should suffice to prevent pollution by waste discharge from any
point within a scenic river area. Should pollution emanate from points
outside the boundaries of a national wild or scenic river, the United
States would probably pursue its remedies as any other landowner
would, under applicable state law.
CONCLUSION
When a bureaucratic process runs out of control, the only cure
may be to set another bureaucracy running in the opposite direction.
Ideally, the first process should be revised to yield acceptable results.
Howvever, the national water resources development program was sub-
jected to at least three distinct adjustments--the benefit-cost ratio,
coordination with fish and wildlife agencies, and the small watersheds
structural alternative-and still the large dam proposals threatened
the best free-flowing streams. So a countervailing process of preservation
was set in motion to restore balance to the policies on river use and
management. To achieve this balance it was necessary to employ an-
other controversial governmental process, i.e., land acquisition author-
ity. This process too has been adjusted and limited in a number of
ways. The checks written into section 6 of the Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act typify recent trends in recreation, highway, and urban renewal
legislation away from broad general grants of eminent domain authority.
The ecological revolution now underway will change the criteria
by which many programs and activities are judged. Institutions are
bound to become more complex. To live in harmony with the environ-
ment will thus be as great a challenge to the legal profession as to
any other.
135 16 U.S.C. § 1283(c) (Supp. IV, 1969).
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